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Abstract: This inquiry considers similar yet contrasting patterns in the
economic development of South Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan’s
developmental state has tended to exhibit ‘softer’ characteristics than
South Korea’s. I identify a tendency for when developmental states face
crises and then transition forward to a ‘post-developmental state’. This is
traced to the internal 'paradox of success' and external pressure of
neoliberal globalization. Though these two countries tend to embrace and
rely upon neoliberal policies for economic growth, the speed and degree of
systemic change register as different. A 1997 financial crisis appears to
have goaded South Korea to move quickly through a transition to a
neoliberal economy, while Taiwan undertook a relatively gradual transition
that offered different outcomes. In the processes of these two transitions, I
cannot identify a ‘double movement’ in the Polanyian sense. Relatedly,
working classes lacking in power and with uncertain targets to fight—
byproducts of a developmental state—appear to dampen the spirit for
effective social movements.
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This inquiry seeks to establish that South Korea and Taiwan exhibit similar as
well as distinctly contrasting approaches and patterns in economic development.
The two countries share East Asian developmental states' characteristics. S.W.
Yun (2002, 2) defined the developmental state paradigm as a set of theories,
techniques, and arguments that relate economic performance to state-centered
institutional systems. This article reviews developmental state theory and
attempts to explain the economic development of Korea and Taiwan through this
discussion. The review of developmental state theory can be divided into the
background of the discussion, common characteristics, crisis, and the transition
to the post-developmental state. Based on the understanding of the theory, this
paper compares the patterns of development in Korea and Taiwan, focusing on
the process of transition to a post-developmental state. Lastly, with the concept
“double movement” proposed by Polanyi, this paper tries to describe the reaction
of the systematic change at the time.

Part 1. The Developmental States and the Post Developmental States
In the mid-20th century, East Asian countries achieved rapid economic growth as
followers in a different way from the market-oriented growth of the West.
Johnson (1982, 17) first conceptualized East Asian countries' economic
development academically as a developmental state. Johnson (1982) analyzed the
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process of extraordinary Japanese economic growth in the mid-to-late 20th
century, explaining that a developmental state is a country that actively intervenes
in the economy and markets for the goal of prioritizing economic growth.
Subsequently, scholars suggested common characteristics of developmental
states in East Asia by expanding research subjects to South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hongkong. The developmental states' elements can be
summarized as follows: 1) economic development as a top-priority national
policy goal 2) a country that its government actively engages in the market 3) a
few competent elites exert a strong influence on policy decisions. (Johnson, 1982;
Amsden 1991, 284; Evans 1998; Woo-Cummings, 1999) A scholar like Loriaux
(1999, 252) grouped France in the developmental category, but this
categorization proved controversial. People usually use the term “developmental
state” to explain the “East Asian development model”. However, it is necessary
to encourage caution in using this term because the growth path of emerging East
Asian countries tends not to be uniform. S.W. Yun (2005, 136) points out that,
unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong is more likely to be considered a
free-market model emphasizing market mechanisms. Singapore also adopts a
growth model based on slippery capital despite strong national guidance.
Low (2004, 5) defined the developmental state as one which promotes
long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among the industrial elite comprising key
business groups and resists growth-compromising demands from special interest
2

groups. In terms of the market intervention of the state, H. J. Chang (2002, 142)
regards it as a universal feature of late industrialization from the entire history of
capitalism, while Chu (1989, 671) insists that the active and effective state can be
found in different authority structures. Woo-Cummings (1999, 71) highlighted
that government's role of developmental states should be understood as a unique
development model with historical specificity. He argued that the governmentled development could only be possible under a specific historical situation in the
20th century that East Asian countries were facing. Specifically, the emergence
and growth of developmental states in East Asia result from the international Cold
War externally and the unique historical conditions of East Asian countries such
as the war in the colonial period, national division internally.
Scholars recognized that the possibility of a developmental state crisis and
systematic transition into a neo-liberal economic system. S. W. Yun (2020, 179)
points out that the phenomenon of convergence to neoliberalism occurs to some
extent in any development model. This is because the state's historically
successful economic intervention could result in a paradoxical result as the
economy grows. For example, Amsden (1991, 20) argues that the state's
economic intervention does not necessarily guarantee development because it is
likely to lead to rent-seeking activities that undermine economic efficiency. L. S.
Kim (1997, 83) also indicates that the decrease in the power of government
institutions in globalization can lead the developmental states to risk.
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The virtuous cycle between developmental state and economic growth is by
no means a constant structural characteristic. Scholars who insist on the
possibility of crisis believe that the state's historically successful economic
intervention could result in a paradoxical result as the economy grows. The
effectiveness of the state's intervention could be exhausted over time, while the
emergence of 'grave-digger', such as large enterprises strongly linked to
government and strong labor unions, could limit economic development and
procure new social conflicts (Evans 1989, 575; Huang 2011: 139). By doing so,
the authoritarian government can generate social inefficiency such as corruption.
Some scholars indicate that the decrease in the power of government institutions
in globalization can lead the developmental states to risk. In sum, a
developmental state could gradually decline as the institutional foundations of the
developmental state, such as state autonomy and strong state-social relationship
(capital-labor) are weakened d as a result of long-term economic growth and
globalization. Consequently, developmental states must fully or partially accept
and adopt deregulation, openness, liberalization, and privatization to strengthen
international competitiveness and ensure the legitimacy of the state's intervention.
East Asian developmental states, which continued to grow rapidly until
the middle of the 20th century, faced a financial crisis and transformed toward a
post-developmental state. S. W. Yun (2020, 21) categorized theories regarding
the characteristics of the post-developmental state into three. First, there is a
4

theory expecting post-developmental state could transform into a regulatory state
in the Western sense. Jayasuriya (2005, 382) argues that after the 1990s, the
developmental states go through dissolution and extinction of developmental
state nature and eventually transformed into a neoliberal regulatory state. In a
regulatory state, the government plays a role in ensuring the free transaction in a
market and market stability, instead of implementing strategic industrial policy
and active market intervention. The second theory expects that the postdevelopmental state will sustain the role of the authoritarian government due to
the institutional inertia and path dependence. Pirie (2018, 10) argues that
government intervention and developmentalism would be continuous, while
states' traditional role is weakening or declining. The fact that governments also
played a crucial role in restructuring shows that the state's willingness to intervene
and control the overall economy could be sustained. The third theory is about the
possibility of transition to a “social corporatist developmental state”. According
to Evans (1989, 574), Strategic state intervention would be valid and sustainable
in the future if the embedded autonomy of the developmental state, which was
previously limited to the government and the capital, expands to the people such
as the working class. Weiss & Hobson (1995) also expect the transition from a
'strong government - weak civil society' to a flexible state of 'strong government
- strong civil society', which leads the developmental state to achieve growth and
distribution at the same time.
5

Part 2. Approaches and Patterns in South Korea's Development
South Korea went through a rapid transformation due to the economic crisis in
1997. There was a gradual change in the economic system in Korea has been
sought since the mid-1980s. S. W. Yun (2003, 4) points out that both internal
contradictions of the developmental state and external pressure have led to the
transformation of the Korean economic system from the developmental state to a
neoliberal economy. Firstly, South Korea went through institutional change since
the late 1980s because of internal conflicts. In conjunction with the
democratization movement in the 70s and 80s, South Korea abolished the
Industrial Development Act allowing selective and direct support to certain
industries in 1986. Also, South Korea abolished the Korean Institute of Economic
Planning, a symbol of the developmental state, in 1994. S. W. Yun (2002, 18)
indicates that the attempt to amend the labor law in 1996 to allow layoffs is a part
of the transitions. Of course, it cannot be overlooked that various kinds of
pressures, such as the Uruguay Round to liberalize and deregulate the
developmental state, led to the transition of the Korean economic system.
An unprecedented financial crisis and following the IMF agreement in
1997 accelerated the decline and dissolution of the developmental state in South
Korea eventually. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, which took power
immediately after the crisis, implemented strong restructuring based on the IMF
agreement. The IMF calls for structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in countries
6

experiencing financial crises. Kwon & Yoo (1999, 23) summarize the basic
elements of SAPs as the devaluation of the currency, reduction of state
intervention in the economy, abolition of price and exchange rate control,
reduction of government spending on public services, and privatization of public
enterprises. Consequently, Korea has experienced radical neoliberal restructuring
in a short period through a Memorandum on the Economic Program and the
agreement on “Republic of Korea: IMF stand-by Arrangement (SBA), Summary
of Economic Program (1997)”. (Kwon & Yoo 1999, 24)
Table 1. Neoliberal Transition of South Korea
Characteristics of
Korean industrialization policy
(Amsden, 1991)

IMF Structural Adjustment Programs
(Kwon & Yoo 1999, 25)

Sector
n

Prohibition of government intervention in
bank management

Financial
Market

n

Adjustment

of

n
financial

soundness

supervision standards to the BIS

Debt Financing by controlling
interest rates

n

Protecting Domestic Industry

n

Expansion of foreign stock investment limit

from

n

Permission for Foreign capitals to establish

Investment

Foreign

Direct

local banks and stock companies

Product
Market

n

Reduction of corporate debt ratio

n

Abolition of government supports and tax
incentives to rescue companies

n

Abolition

of

trade-related

government

n

Policy financing through
subsidies, tax incentives, and
low loan ratio for firms

n

Protecting domestic market
through high tariff and import
regulation

n

Labors’
learning
and
innovation
by
long-term
employment

n

The combination of low wage

subsidies and import approval system

Labor
Market

n

Enhancing labor market flexibility and
strengthening

the

function

employment insurance system

of

the

base and fast wage increase
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Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of Korean industrial policy
(Amsden, 1991), which shows the industrialization process in South Korea as a
late industrialized country and the contents of restructuring conducted under IMF
bailout conditions. Through this table, it will be possible to understand the
direction and contents of the neoliberal systemic transition of South Korea in the
late 1990s.
There is a controversy over whether this shift to a neoliberal economic
policy was forced from the outside. For example, Wade and Veneroso (1998, 2)
pointed out that the so-called Wall Street- US Treasury - IMF Complex requested
the opening of the capital market, liberalization of finance and trade, and
suspension of business in bad financial status in the first negotiations between the
IMF and the Korean government in December 1997. Also, B. C. Lee (1999, 126)
argued that the external pressure drove the Kim Dae-Jung administration to set
the restructuring t to a laissez-faire economy, even though the regime preferred
German or Japanese capitalism because of external pressure. However, J. H. Ji
(2007, 21) refutes this position by pointing out that Korean government officials
suggested most of the structural reform proposals included in the Korean IMF
program by themselves. Also, he pointed out that the systemic transition to neoliberalism has expanded beyond the IMF's demands even after the full repayment
of the bailout funds in 2001. Furthermore, this set of radical neoliberal
restructuring tended to gain political justification from the labor market reform.
8

L. S. Kim (1997, 48) indicates that the government has oppressed laborers for a
long time to allow businesses to utilize cheap labor. Because small East Asian
countries lack natural resources, cheap and skilled labor was the only resource
for them. Consequently, the state tended to suppress the laborers and labor unions
to secure a cheap labor force. In this context, some people consider the IMF's
requests to soften the labor market and strengthen labor protection as attempts to
protect the working class.
Korean transition to the neoliberal system has the following characteristics
in terms of its development model. First, S.W. Yun (2020, 179) evaluates that
Korea's neoliberal policies are extremely instrumental, rather than aiming for the
economic operation that fully realizes the market principle. South Korea utilized
neo-liberal policies as incentives for attracting foreign capital, expanding
corporate investment, and promoting exports. If necessary, the Korean
government implements Keynesian or developmental state policies, conflicting
with neoliberalism. For example, the Korean government uses public funds for
some insolvent large companies.

Part 3. Approaches and Patterns in Taiwan's Development
The characteristics of the Taiwanese developmental state are softer than that of
South Korea. First, Amsden & Chu (2003, 125) indicated that the goal of the
financial policies (exchange rate policy, interest rate policy, policy finance) of the
9

Taiwanese government were not only economic growth but also economic
stability. Taiwan often implements high-interest policies to balance economic
growth and economic stability, which is different from the Korean government’s
finical policy sacrificing economic stability through aggressive low-interest
policies. (D. C. Kang, 1995) In terms of industrial policy, Taiwan also conducted
various policies to support and discipline industries in a less direct way. Amsden
& Chu (2003, 110) argued that the Taiwanese government focused on promoting
investment and production in the private sector by creating an appropriate
investment environment rather than strong intervention. In terms of the labor
market, S.W. Yun (2002, 11) pointed out that the Taiwanese government put
efforts to embrace the working class and labor, while they were fundamentally
repressive like other developmental states. Taiwanese government tried
strengthened the protection for workers through the revision of the labor law of
1984 and connect the labor market between rural and urban areas. For example,
the government implemented a policy promoting urban manufacturing plants by
employing farmers as part-time workers.
Taiwanese soft developmental state also has experienced a transition to
the neoliberal market system gradually. Amsden & Chu (2003, 136) regarded that
the Taiwanese government has pursued a transformation aimed at liberalization
and globalization of the economy since the 1980s. They argued that, like South
Korea, Taiwan went through a process of weakening and declining developmental
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state due to changes in the relationship between state-world, state-civil society,
and state-capital since the 1980s. However, unlike South Korea and other East
Asian countries, Taiwan did not face the financial crisis in 1997 and maintained
the economic system and state's overall economic policy.
Pirie (2018) argues that the pressure to change the Taiwanese economic
system significantly has been raised internally and externally since the 2000s.
First, the vitality of the Taiwanese economy required changes in the economic
system as the low-growth and low-investment phases continued throughout the
2000s. Hwang (2020) indicated that this stagnation is partly because of the
Taiwanese economy's hollowing out problem generated by Taiwanese companies'
investment in China, which accelerated after the 1990s. Furthermore, as a result
of the presidential election in 2000, the long-lasting rule of the Kuomintang
(KMT) Party, which was the political foundation of the developmental state in
Taiwan, was replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Chu (2013,
662) pointed out that the new Chen Shui-bian administration was quite agitated
by the neoliberal shift adopted by many East Asian countries. Furthermore, to
join the WTO in 2001, the Taiwanese government also had to fulfill the conditions
such as deregulation in the financial sector and the opening and liberalization of
international financial capital.
However, scholars tend to assess that the Taiwanese economic system
maintained the institutional continuity of the developmental state despite changes
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in internal and external circumstances after the 2000s. (Wang, 2012; Chu, 2014;
Yun, 2009). Chu (2014, 11) pointed out that the Taiwanese developmental state
system has almost maintained its former form, authority, and function despite the
regime's democratization and the change in the regime. In Taiwan, economic
institutions such as the Economic Construction Committee and the Industrial
Bureau of the Ministry of Economy are in existence, and they are still planning
and implementing economic development policies. Furthermore, Wong (2005,
186) called Taiwan economic development model an adaptive developmental
state because the Taiwanese government plays a vital role in transforming
traditional industries into high-tech industries. Second, Chu (2014, 10) mentions
that the Taiwanese developmental state maintains strong control over the
financial sector through the central bank. He points out that Taiwan's state directly
owned three of the top 10 commercial banks and controlled four, and owned and
controlled 43% of the total banking assets in 2008. Chu (2014, 15) also points out
that the Taiwanese government tried to delay the privatization of public
enterprises and the privatization of banks as much as possible.
As a result, unlike Korea and Japan, which explicitly performed neoliberal transitions, the Taiwanese government partially introduced the neoliberal
policy and welfare-state policy in a specific area while maintaining the basic
nature of the developmental state. However, S. W. Yun (2020, 177) indicates that
the developmental state's policy performance and economic efficiency are
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significantly weakening, unlike in the past. He points out that the downturn of
low growth and low investments in the Taiwanese economy from the 2000s
implies developmental state is no longer valid in the era of neoliberal
globalization, even though the institutional inertia of the developmental state is
maintained.

Part 4. Double Movement in the Process of Transformation
In the Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi argued that the development of
market societies over the past two hundred years had been shaped by a double
movement. On one side is the movement of laissez-faire, the efforts by a variety
of groups to expand the scope and influence of self-regulating markets. On the
other side has been the movement of protection – the initiatives, again by a wide
range of social actors, to insulate the fabric of social life from the destructive
impact of market pressures. (Block 2008, 1)
There is no general theory about the role of the state in Polanyi’s theory of the
double movement. However, he mentioned several times that the role of the state
is essential in the economic development process. Polanyi (2009, 407-410)
argued that the formation of self-regulating markets, which find their equilibrium
by themselves, actually required state intervention. He pointed out that the
liberalist did not rule out government intervention to maintain a self-regulating
market but rather actively asked and utilized it to operationalize the markets. The
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liberalists regularly demanded coercive action from the state to pass union-related
or anti-monopoly laws.
Some scholars theorized the role of the state in the double movement. Block
and Somers (1984) pay attention to the role of the state performing the double
movement. Block (2004, 4) argued states could follow self-regulating markets
principle and the social protection principle depending on the political and
economic conditions and how social actors have perceived those specific
conditions. On the other hand, Gislain (1987, 150) mentions that Polanyi's state
plays a role in guaranteeing social order and social system. Similarly, Searcy
(1993, 222~223) insists that the power of social protection is stronger among the
double movements. These studies argue that Polanyi's state is carrying out a
double movement for social protection because the power of social protection is
stronger among the double movements.
In either direction, the state plays a role in the movement process. A state
can realize or coordinate conflicts between ideologies and classes. Clark (2015,
7) argued that a state can coordinate individual activities through enforcing laws
and commandeering resources as a sovereign political entity. In the case of
developmental states, the role of the authoritarian state in the process of economic
development, including double movement could be even more important. As we
saw in the development process of South Korea and Taiwan, the states have been
actively setting a direction among economic actors. For example, the Korean
14

government implemented low-interest rate and low-income policies for rapid
economic growth, while the Taiwanese government pursued economic stability
simultaneously with economic growth.
However, there was no social movement in East Asia during the transition from
a developmental state to a neo-liberal state. The reasons for this fact can also be
interpreted considering the historical path of the developmental states. First, in
contrast to the western cases, the working-class was too weak to lead social
movements. This is because developmental states companies could hire workers
at relatively low wages and workers were under the protection of the corporate
welfare system, not the state. For example, S. M. Eun (2009, 12) pointed out that,
in 1997, Korean workers were under a corporate welfare system, where they
could live only after long-term employment in decent jobs. This can be seen as a
result of Korea's state-led policies supporting low wage policy and adjusting the
relative price of goods in the international market by interfering with the role of
labor unions as a late-industrial country (Amsden, 1986). In a fast-growing
country, the low wage policy was not a big problem. As a result of the IMF
restructuring, however, Korean workers lose all of the power to counter the state
or the market when fired. The situation can't be described as just such a high
unemployment rate. According to a newspaper article at the time, the
abandonment without various shields destroyed individuals physically and
mentally and their home as a basic unit of society. The newspaper article follows
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describes the situation at the time.
The financial crisis first destroyed homes. People cheated on
husbands/wives secretly, abandoned old mothers, and killed fathers.... and
domestic violence increased. There was prostitution by Housewives.... a
housewife who sold her body to earn tutoring expenses for her child, and a
young female left the house at night to pay for her baby.... Not a few children
were abandoned by their parents. Parents, especially single parents, who have
no living expenses, left their children in the nursery for a while, and they didn’t
come again. (CBS Special Coverage, 2001)
Second, it was not clear who people would protest against. In the process
of transition from the developmental state to a neoliberal system, the state did not
necessarily make a decision that was beneficial to the enterprise. Amsden (1984,
93-106) indicates that developmental states, as followers, adjust prices through
policy financing and export subsidies to protect their domestic businesses.
However, in such developmental states, the IMF took measures to establish
financial supervision standards in line with BIS standards and reduce the scope
of policy financing in a short period. Consequently, many companies went
bankrupt. K. Kim (1998, 15) argues that it was completely unreasonable to
immediately impose the BIS standard, which was gradually introduced over a
long period to advanced countries due to concerns about corporate bankruptcy.
As a result, austerity policies resulted in mass unemployment and large-scale
16

corporate bankruptcy, which led to a vicious cycle leading to corporate
insolvency, bankruptcy, and insolvent debt. In this situation, people consider the
market as a victim suffering the same pain rather than an enemy. Furthermore, in
Korea’s case, the Kim Dae-Jung administration, who led the transition, gained
power as a result of the democratization movement in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Thus, it was also hard for citizens to make the government an enemy.

Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that South Korea and Taiwan exhibit similar
as well as contrasting approaches and patterns in economic development. While
both countries offer examples of successful, developmental states, the
characteristics exhihbited by Taiwan’s developmental state's characteristics were
softer than for South Korea. According to a theory of the ‘developmental state’,
the internal 'paradox of success' taking the form as high rates of high growth in
per capita output undermine the state’s structural foundation, while external
pressures associated with neoliberal globalization serve to generate crises. One
particular crisis led the transition from a developmental state to a postdevelopmental state. South Korea experienced a rapid transition to a neoliberal
economy, with the financial crisis taking place towards the end of the 1990s,
while Taiwan experienced a relatively gradual transition to a post developmental
state. Consequently, while the models found in both countries tend to converge
17

towards neoliberal systems, the key characteristics of their developmental states
differ. In other words, both nations have a strong tendency to instrumentally
embrace neoliberal systems for economic growth, even though the degree of
systemic change is different.
Invoking the term “great transformation, Karl Polanyi described
emergence and societal transition to a market economy. Following Polanyi’s lead,
this inquiry has also considered the transition of the developmental state as an
important ‘transformation’ while also seeking to bear out the societal reaction to
change. This research suggests that in both South Korea and Taiwan, we cannot
identify a “double movement” in the Polanyian sense taking place in the
transformation from the developmental to post-developmental state. When
considering South Korea, we cannot identify a significat social movement, even
though the transformation changed people’s lives fundamentally. We explain this
tendency to the relataively powerless working classes that appears related to the
use of industrial development policy. We can also identify that targets to achieved
tended to remain uncertain and this is traced to the mixed relationships between
agents that served to dampen the spirit for social movement. When people
evaluate the transformation of the developmental state of the formal economy, it
could be shown as a successful one. However, it is necessary to examine the
transformation of the substantive economy—emphasized by Polanyi—by
looking at the change of society through the change of the economic system.
18

Bibliography:
Amsden, Alice Diffusion of development: The late-industrializing model and
greater East Asia. The American Economic Review, 81(2), 282-286, 1991.
Amsden, Alice and Chu, W. Beyond late development: Taiwan's upgrading
policies. Mit Press, 2003.
Block, Fred. "Polanyi’s double movement and the reconstruction of critical
theory." Revue interventions économiques. Papers in political
economy 38 (2008).
Block, F. and Somers, M., 1986. Beyond the economistic fallacy: The holistic
social science of Karl Polanyi. Vision and method in historical sociology,
pp.47-84.
Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking away the ladder: development strategy in historical
perspective. Anthem Press, 2002.
Chu, Yun-han. 2013. “Coping with the Global Financial Crises: Institutional and
Ideational Sources of Taiwan’s Economic Resiliency.” Contemporary
China 22 (82), 649-668.
Chu, Y. H. "Unraveling the Enigma of East Asian economic resiliency." Two
Crises, Different Outcomes: East Asia and Global Finance (2015): 64.
T. J. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa, eds. Two Crises, Different Outcomes: East
Asia and Global Finance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dent, C. M. Taiwan's Foreign Economic Policy: The ‘Liberalization Plus’
Approach of an Evolving Developmental State. Modern Asian
Studies, 37(2), 461-483, 2003.
19

Eun, S.M. IMF crisis. Vol. 7. Book World, 2017.
Evans, Peter B. "Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative
political economy perspective on the third world state." In Sociological
Forum, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 561-587. Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum
Publishers, 1989.
Gislain, Jean-Jacques. "On the Relation of State and Market." Telos 1987, no. 73
(1987): 147-152.
Hsu, J. Y.. State tansformation and regional development in Taiwan: From
developmentalist strategy to populist subsidy. International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research, 35(3), 600-619, 2011.
Hwang Seokman. "Taiwan democratization and changing capitalist system." Asia
Review 9, no. 2 (2020): 261-290.
Jayasuriya, Kanishka. "Beyond institutional fetishism: From the developmental
to the regulatory state." New Political Economy 10, no. 3 (2005): 381-387.
Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial
policy, 1925-1975. Stanford University Press, 1982.
Kang, D. C. South Korean and Taiwanese development and the new institutional
economics. International Organization, 49(3), 555-587, 1995.
Kim, Kyun & Park, S. S. "The Kim Dae-jung administration's economic policy
and neoliberalism." [Crisis and Great Turn]. Contemporary (1998).
Kim, L. S. Imitation to innovation: The dynamics of Korea's technological
learning. Harvard business press, 1997.
20

Kim, Y. T. Neoliberalism and the decline of the developmental state. Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 29(4), 441-461, 1999.
Kwon, H. C., & Yoo, J. L.. Neoliberal ideology enforced by the IMF. Critical
Social Policy, (1999),13-45.
Lauridsen, L. S. Governance and economic transformation in Taiwan: The role
of politics. Development Policy Review, 32(4), 427-448, 2014.
Low, Linda. Developmental states: Relevancy, redundancy or reconfiguration?.
Nova Publishers, 2004.
Pirie, Iain. "Korea and Taiwan: the crisis of investment-led growth and the end
of the developmental state." Journal of contemporary Asia 48, no. 1
(2018): 133-158.
Polanyi. K. The great Transformation. A huge transition. Translated by G. B.
Hong. Gil, 2009.
Stenfield. J. R. Karl Polanyi's Economic Thought. Translated by Y. C. Won,
Hanul, 1997.
Yun, S.W. " East Asian Development Model at a Crossroads: A Comparative
Study of Korea and Taiwan." Korea and international politics 18,
no. 3 (2002): 1-28.
Yun, S.W. Neoliberalization of Korea after the financial crisis: focusing on
national character changes and policy responses. Economy and Society
(2009).
Yun, S.W. "The evaluation of China's growth system based on the 'developmental
state'." Korean Sociology 39, no. 2 (2005): 135-162
21

Yun, S.W. Transformations of the Developmental State into the
Post-Developmental State : Experiences of South Korea, Japan, and
Taiwan. Asia Review, 9(2), 159-189, 2020.
Weiss, Linda, and John M. Hobson. States and economic development:
a comparative historical analysis. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
Wong, Joseph. "The adaptive developmental state in East Asia." Journal of East
Asian Studies 4, no. 3 (2004): 345-362.
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the politics of
nationalism and development." The developmental state (1999): 1-31.

22

Appendix
*Data Sources: The Global Competitiveness Index, World Economic Forum (2005-2019)
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2. Government (rank, the lower rank indicates the higher value)
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3. Market (rank, the lower rank indicates the higher value)
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